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McPherson: Symposium: The Guatemala Protocol

THE GUATEMALA PROTOCOL
IAN E. MCPHERSON*

A

TItis STATE we have heard the presentation by Mr. Boyle who

represented, generally, I think the position of the United States
Government, and Mr. Kreindler representing the claimants' attorneys;
and he is one of the most distinguished claimants' attorneys in the United
States. It would be presumptuous for me to comment on the pros and cons
of this situation as far as the United States is concerned, and I would like
to limit my comments to observations as a lawyer who is interested in
international law. Of course I may be prejudiced, being a representative
of an airline and the air carrier industry. Having heard Mr. Kreindler,
one can appreciate what a formidable adversary he can be, particularly in
front of a jury. I have heard him speak before and on other occasions he
has indicated how much he is in favor of the jury system. It is very
apparent why. He also reiterated two or three times "Why are we here?
Why are we here?" Quite frankly, I have a pretty good idea why
Mr. Lee Kreindler is here. We all have particular interests to represent
and it is natural that we would express somewhat subjective views from
time to time and may not be entirely altruistic.
Mr. Boyle spoke of the three objectives or criteria of the United
States Government in advocating the Guatemala Protocol and also the
Supplemental Compensation provisions thereof. He referred to certainty,
speed and sufficiency of recovery. Certainty and speed I think are perhaps
pretty obvious. They are inherent in the Guatemala Convention. The
sufficiency of recovery, of course, is a very controversial point and one
on which Mr. Kreindler certainly would not agree with Mr. Boyle, and
I don't think agrees with me. There is another very significant objective
that has been overlooked and that is the great desirability of uniformity
of law. As the world gets smaller and smaller this desire to develop a form
of international law in some areas where there is no uniformity is highly
desirable. The World Peace Through The Rule of Law Organization itself
has pointed out that the Warsaw Convention,' which has over 100 countries adhering to it, is a fine example of how this international law can be
developed. It enables your passenger, no matter where he is flying to
be confident that he has certain protection available to him. This is true
whether he is under civil law jurisdiction, common law jurisdiction or the
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various laws in the Orient, and also in those jurisdictions where the rights
of recovery are very seriously restricted, which they are in many countries.
I recall some years ago where they had a limitation of liability in
Brazil which through inflation resulted in an airline passenger, an
American, making I think a recovery that amounted to about $75. It was
a death action and the law when it had been passed had been relatively
generous. I say relatively because, of course, all of these countries have
very different concepts as to what damages should be recoverable.
Obviously, when you are developing a Convention of this nature in
international law, when you are trying to get uniformity, you must make
compromises. It is a two-way street. Transportation may be from the
United States but it also is to England, or France, or Germany, or
other parts of the world.
There is a great variance in the law of these countries and to secure
the interests of the passenger you must make compromises. For example,
there is a fundamental difference in your practice in the United States
from that of most other countries, and that is your practice of charging
fees on a contingency basis. The law of many countries provides that the
courts will award costs generally against the unsuccessful party and this
distinction in fact has been recognized in the Hague Protocol to the
Warsaw Convention 2 and also in the Guatemala Protocol 3 thereto. Again
in the Montreal Agreement, 4 for example, a distinction was made for the
recovery of $75,000 in jurisdictions where legal fees were not recoverable
and $58,000 where legal fees were recoverable 5 thus recognizing the
practice in the United States of a claimant's lawyer recovering a substantial
part of his legal fees from the judgment obtained. Although I am certainly
not an authority on this subject I think that the fees run in the vicinity
of 30% and this is recognized in these compromises.
There are many other areas where the national laws vary considerably
and where, in order to obtain uniformity, concessions must be made in
international law. For example, you have the fundamental question of
whether liability should be based on fault, which is a traditional common
law concept. A great many countries do not follow this practice. Some have
presumptions of fault that are rebuttable. Others have absolute liability.
Again there can be great variances in the amount of damages which
may be awarded based not only on the extreme economic differences but
also on certain concepts of morality and sociology. In those countries

2 478 U.N.T.S. 371.
3 ICAO Doc. 8878-L.C. 162 (1970) [hereinafter references to specific provisions of
the convention will be: The Guatemala Protocol, Art .
4 Agreement CAB 18990, approved by order E-23680, May 13, 1966 (Doc. 17325).
51Id. para. 1.
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where you have smaller damages awarded, one of the great arguments is
why under international agreements should the poor pay for the rich. In
this respect Mr. Kreindler spoke of having to pay a $2.00 assessment for
the privilege of having his liability limited. On the other side of the coin,
however, it must be recognized that the privilege of being able to claim
unlimited damages must also be paid for by someone and eventually it is
the passenger who will pay whether or not he may be one of the few to
which unlimited damages may be significant. Putting it another way, it is
the average consumer who will pay and he should not be required to pay
increased fares to cover the payment to others of damages which bear
little relationship to his own circumstances. It is for these reasons that
in order to obtain the most good for the most people compromises
must be made which may be to the detriment of a very small minority.
Finally, this extra compensation system that Mr. Boyle has outlined
has been described very well as a three-tier system.
Basically, your airline has the fundamental liability of up to roughly
$100,000 under Guatemala,6 and it is based upon the theory of
absolute liability. 7 The airlines do not like absolute liability because
notwithstanding the skill of claims attorneys and the application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and like principles, there are situations where
one can deny liability totally, and if we are interested in limiting liability
or eliminating liability defenses are available to us.
The second tier is provided for by the Government. The Government
in the United States has recognized that to obtain uniformity, that is a
treaty, it cannot negotiate more than a $100,000 maximum liability. This
was made very apparent to the United States at Guatemala. At the same
time it has concluded that United States' citizens should have available
some compensation in excess of that, and this is what will be provided for
under the extra compensation plan. Whether it is an extra $100,000 or
$200,000, of course, would be up to the United States Government to
decide. But there would be this second tier. And then on top of this second
tier there will be some passengers, a proportion of the less than 200
affected annually by the Warsaw Convention referred to by Mr. Kreindler,
who will be able to cover their additional potential damages by taking
out flight insurance.
I submit that when all the facts are considered the Guatemala
Protocol to the Warsaw/Hague Convention, when supplemented by the
extra compensation system where a Contracting State deems it necessary,
adequately meets the requirements of most passengers and carriers and its
ratification will greatly enhance the rule of law throughout the world.

6

The Guatemala Protocol, Art. 22, para. 1(a).

7 Id.Art. 17, para. 1.
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